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NOTES
ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT IN FLORIDA
I. ANTICIPATORY BREACH IN GENERAL
The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract has long been a favorite
subject of discussion and argument, by both the courts and the legal
academicians, since its origin in England almost one hundred years ago.'
It was adequately and concisely defined by the United States Supreme
Court in the following words: ". . . where the contract is renounced
before performance is due, and the renunciation goes to the whole of the
contract, and is absolute and unequivocal, the injured party may treat
the breach as complete and bring his action at once .... ,,2 It is generally
held that the contract must be bilateral and wholly executory, 3 as in the
founding case.4 The doctrine applies to unilateral contracts only when
the promisor's duty is conditional upon some future performance by the
promisee. 5 The doctrine of anticipatory breach is recognized today by
England, 6 the United States Supreme Court,7 an overwhelming majority
of the states,8 and the Restatement of the Law of Contracts.9 Only two
states1 o constitute the minority that refuses to recognize the doctrine at
'Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q. B. 1853). Plaintiff
had entered into a contract with the defendant to serve him as a courier for three
months beginning June 1, 1852. On May 11th the defendant wrote to the plaintiff
declining his services. The action was begun May 22nd. HELD, the action was
proper and not prematurely brought.
'Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 7 (1900).
'Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1 (1900) ; Hanson v. Newman, 286 Il. App. 197, 3 N.
E.2d 110 (1936); Huffman v. Martin, 226 Ky. 137, 10 S. W.2d 636 (1928); RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS §318 (1932).
'Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q. B. 1853).
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §318 (1932).
'Michael v. Hart, 1 K. B. 482 (1902); The Danube & Black Sea Ry. v. Xenos,
13 C. B. N. S. 825, 143 Eng. Rep. 325 (1862); Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678,
118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q. B. 1853).
'Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1 (1900).
'Hart-Parr Co. v. Finley, 31 N. D. 130, 153 N. W. 137 (1915); Nichols v. Scranton
Steel Co., 137 N. Y. 471, 33 N. E. 561 (1893) ; Pierson v. Dorff, 198 Wis. 43, 223 N. W.
579 (1929); GRiSmoRE, CONTRACTS §178 (1947).
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §318 (1932).
"'Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 350, 19 Am. St. Rep. 384 (1874); King v. Water-
[244]
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all. It is, however, as remarked by one court,1 erroneously applied quite
frequently to cases in which performance has been partially completed.
12
II. T=a FLORIDA SITUATION
The doctrine of anticipatory breach admits of difficulty in Florida. In
fact, there is some controversy as to whether it is recognized at all in this
state. Professor Williston, generally conceded to be America's outstand-
ing authority on the law of contracts, maintains in his treatise that Florida
does not recognize the doctrine.' 3 On the other hand, it is contended
by another authority that the only diffculty in this jurisdiction is the
sufficiency of the renunciation.' 4 The outstanding Florida case involving
the doctrine, Slaughter v. Barnett,'5 is the basis of the controversy. The
facts of the case are essentially simple. Before the date set for perform-
ance of a contract for the sale of land, the vendor informed the purchaser
that he was not going to perform. The question then arose as to whether
the purchaser could treat the contract as breached in omnibus and imme-
diately bring his action for damages, as for a present breach of contract.
The Court held that he could not, saying that the renunciation "... . must
appear distinctly, unequivocally, absolutely .... ."16 The Court went
on to set out, as follows, the factual circumstances that would constitute
a sufficient renunciation in cases involving contracts for the sale of land:
1'
"If the vendor has no title to the land he has contracted to sell,
and is unable to deliver on the date he contracted to sell, or gives an
excuse in bad faith for failing to convey as in the Key v. Alexander
Case ... or divests himself of title to a third person, thus rendering
man, 55 Neb. 324, 75 N. W. 830 (1898); Carstens v. McDonald, 38 Neb. 858, 57 N. W.
757 (1894).
1 1Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 19 (1900).
"tWalker v. Harbor Business Blocks Co., 181 Cal. 773, 186 Pac. 356 (1919);
Sprague, Warner & Co. v. Iowa Mercantile Co., 186 Iowa 488, 172 N. W. 637 (1919) ;
Pollack v. Pollack, 39 S. W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Ambler v. Sinaiko, 168 Wis.
286, 170 N. W. 270 (1919).
15 W=TrzsToN, ColmrAcrs 3712 (Rev. Ed. 1937).
1 GaRsmoRE, Comcrs 287 (1947).
11114 Fla. 352, 154 So. 134 (1934).
"'id. at 364, 154 So. at 138.
"The cases referred to in the following quotation are: Key v. Alexander, 91 Fla.
975, 108 So. 883 (1926); Stanley v. Anthony Farms, 93 Fla. 295, 112 So. 57 (1927);
and Thomas 'v. Walden, 57 Fla. 234, 48 So. 746 (1909).
2
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it impossible to convey a good title to the vendee, as in the Stanley v.
Anthony Farms Case . . . or where the contract was an entire one
and the vendor did not have title to a considerable portion of the land
and could not within a reasonable time acquire title thereto, as in the
Thomas v. Walden Case .... "
After stating these examples of sufficient renunciation, the anomaly of
the decision begins. In its discussion of the doctrine the Court erroneously
stated that anticipatory breach had never been recognized by the United
States Supreme Court.' In substantiation, a case was cited in which
the decision actually turned upon the insufficiency of the renunciation
rather than upon the denial of the doctrine. 19 As a matter of fact, how-
ever, the Supreme Court had expressly recognized the doctrine in 1900.20
It is also interesting to note that a North Dakota case, 21 cited 2 2 as
annouhcing the correct view, had already been overruled in regard to its
denial of the doctrine. 2
3
The question remains, does Florida recognize anticipatory breach of
contract? In at least two quite recent cases 24 the Court stated flatly, by
way of dictum, that anticipatory breach is recognized in this jurisdiction,
but held that it was not applicable to those particular cases. The anomaly
of Florida law on the subject appears again when the cases cited as author-
ity for this statement are examined. One case involved a contract for
personal services, wherein the plaintiff had been discharged without cause
during the contractual term of employment. 25 Since the discharge was
subsequent to the date set for beginning that term, the breach cannot be
considered anticipatory. A second case 28 frankly admitted that because
of the time element it could not be considered as falling under the doc-
trine announced in Hochster v. De la Tour.2 7 In the third case cited the
essentials of anticipatory breach were enumerated, yet the Court held the
"8 Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352, 362, 154 So. 134, 138 (1934).
l"Dingley v. Oler, 117 U. S. 490 (1886).
"Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1 (1900).
"Stanford v. McGill, 6 N. D. 536, 72 N. W. 938 (1897).
"Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352, 366, 154 So. 134, 139 (1934).
"Hart-Parr Co. v. Finley, 31 N. D. 130, 153 N. W. 137 (1915).
"See Perry v. Shaw, 152 Fla. 765, 768, 13 So.2d 811 (1943) ; Gilliland v. Mercantile
Inv. & Holding Co., 147 Fla. 613, 615, 3 So.2d 148, 149 (1941).
"Harris v. Cocoanut Grove Development Co., 63 Fla. 175, 59 So. 11 (1912).
"Sullivan v. McMillan, 26 Fla. 543, 580, 8 So. 450, 457 (1890).
2'2 E. & B. 678, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q. B. 1853).
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doctrine irrelevant under the pleadings.2 8
A few Florida cases, however, including Slaughter v. Barnett, have met
the essential factual requirements of the doctrine,2 9 although their
judicial fates have varied. One case directly in point held that a verbal
refusal to perform was sufficient renunciation in a contract for the sale of
land. 30 It was specifically overruled, however, on the basis that such
renunciation was not sufficient.3 1 Another case allowed recovery when
the land had been conveyed to a third party before the date set for per-
formance.3 2 The reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the Florida
decisions is that, while our courts do recognize the doctrine of anticipatory
breach, the situations that will constitute adequate renunciation are
strictly limited in those cases in which contracts for the sale of land are
involved. When the alleged breach is of any other type of contract, the
only guide as to whether the renunciation is sufficient upon which to
found a right of action is the rather vague statement that the renuncia-
tion ... must appear distinctly, unequivocally, absolutely .... -33
III. RENUNCIATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Regardless of whether an anticipatory or a present breach is involved,
the sufficiency of the renunciation as the basis for a cause of action has
been a frequently litigated question. There are, in general, three cate-
gories in which those renunciations constituting anticipatory breach will
fall. The first of these includes the positive statement to the promisee
indicating that the promisor will not or cannot substantially perform. 3 4
This view has been adopted by a majority of the courts, both in contracts
for the sale of land 3 5 and in those involving personalty.3 6 A verbal
2&'hompson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897).
2'Behrman v. Max, 102 Fla. 1094, 137 So. 120 (1931); Stanley v. Anthony Farms,
93 Fla. 295, 112 So. 57 (1927); Hall v. Northern & Southern Co., SS Fla. 242, 46 So.
178 (1908); Duval Inv. Co. v. Stockton, 54 Fla. 296, 45 So. 497 (1907).
30 Behrman v. Max, 102 Fla. 1094, 137 So. 120 (1931).
"'Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352, 365, 154 So. 134, 139 (1934).
"Stanley v. Anthony Farms, 93 Fla. 295, 112 So. 57 (1927).
"See Slaughter v. Barnett, 114 Fla. 352, 364, 154 So. 134, 138 (1934).
"'RTATEmE "T, Co.'.rAcTs §318(a) (1932).
"E.g., Kuhlman v. Weiben, 129 Iowa 188, 105 N. W. 445 (1905); Chapman v.
Propp, 125 Minn. 447, 147 N. W. 442 (1914) ; Pierson v. Dorff, 198 Wis. 43, 223 N. W.
579 (1929).
"E.g., Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1 (1900).
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denial of the very existence of the contract is also sufficient renuncia-
tion.aT A mere denial of the other party's interpretation of the contract,
however, is no more sufficient a renunciation per se of the contract when
the supposed breach is anticipatory 3 8 than when the breach is present in
nature.3 9 The same is true when there is a declaration of a mere con-
jecture of non-performance 40 or a renunciation that does not go to the
whole of the consideration. 4 1
The second category involves cases in which the promisor has trans-
ferred, or contracted to transfer, the subject of the contract to a third
party. Slaughter v. Barnett4 2 is monumental in Florida in recognizing
this situation as constituting renunciation.
The third and last category presents a more difficult problem. It is
comprised of those other acts which render substantial performance more
or less impossible. One of these is bankruptcy of the promisor, which has
been recognized as a valid basis supporting an action for anticipatory
breach. 43 In fact, the Federal Bankruptcy Act 4 4 specifically allows
claims for anticipatory breach of contract to be proved and allowed against
the estate of the bankrupt. This rule is, however, subject to the qualifi-
cation that the trustee must first be given the option of deciding whether
or not he wishes to continue the contract. 4 5 Preventing performance of
the contract by the other party is another example4 6 of an act constituting
renunciation. A further example is practical renunciation, as illustrated by
the case, which is near the borderline, of the world's champion heavy-
weight boxer who, having signed to fight one opponent, was held to have
renounced that contract by agreeing to fight another opponent only nine-
teen days later. 4 7 Of course, each set of facts must stand on its own
"Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542 (1932).
"Suburban Improvement Co. v. Scott Lumber Co., 67 F.2d 335 (C. C. A. 4th 1933);
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 186 N. Y. 89, 78 N. E. 701 (1906).
"9New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U. S. 672 (1936); Kimel v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 921 (C. C. A. 10th 1934).
'"Atkinson v. District Bond. Co., 5 Cal. App.2d 738, 43 P.2d 867 (1935).
"Grace v. Ford Motor Co., 278 Fed. 955 (C. C. A. 9th 1922).
"114 Fla. 352, 154 So. 134 (1934).
'Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 240 U. S. 581 (1916); Manufac-
turers Trading Corp. v. Roberts, 138 F.2d 806 (C. C. A. 5th 1943); REsTATEM ENr,
CONT aACTS §324 (1932).
"30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended 49 STAT. 1475 (1936), 11 U. S. C. §103 (1940).
"See note 43 supra.
"Black v. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 35 Ga. App. 8, 131 S. E. 543 (1926).
"Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924 (C. C. A. 3rd 1937).
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particular merits, the general rule being that the breach must be a volun-
tary affirmative act which renders substantial performance of the contract
impossible or at least apparently impossible.48
IV. PRACTIcAL REASONS VOR THE DocTRnq
The original reason for founding the doctrine, in Hochster v. De la
Tour, was fallacious and has long been an object of attack by the text
writers.49 The basis of the English court's holding was that, unless such
a rule were established giving the promisee an immediate right of action,
he would be forced to hold himself in readiness until the date set for
performance. It is now generally recognized, however, that the promisee
may treat the renunciation merely as relieving him from such useless
action. 50 It has been suggested that there is another basis upon which
the doctrine is founded, 51 namely, that in every contract there is an
implied promise on the part of each party to the contract that there will
be no renunciation. Hence, such a renunciation is a present breach of an
implied promise.
The practical convenience of the doctrine lies in the fact that it
facilitates speedy settlement of differences between the parties to the
agreement. It need hardly be said that the exigencies of modern com-
merce and the financial welfare of individuals demand expeditious han-
dling of contractual disputes. Furthermore, in the case of contracts bear-
ing a date for performance far removed, the doctrine eliminates the
possibilities of hampering proof of the facts through the passage of time.
The doctrine is both practical and desirable. Florida law in regard to
anticipatory breach is still in its infancy; and it would be indeed regrettable
should our courts fail to allow it full application.
JOHN M. FARmELL
"RESTATE=NT, CONTRACTS §318(c) (1932).
0GRIsmoRzE, CONTRACrS 284 (1947); 5 Wmr.STON, CONTRACTS 3710 (Rev. Ed.
1937).
ZoRoyal Ins. Co. v. Martin, 192 U. S. 149 (1904); Albert v. Ford Motor Co., 112
N. 3. L. 597, 172 AtI. 379 (1934).
"1See Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Pac. Ry., 244 Fed. 485, 502 (S. D. N. Y.
1917).
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